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This Special Issue of the International Journal of Evidence and Proof pays tribute to the 
scholarship of Mike Redmayne, who died last year at the age of only 47 (Roberts, 2015; 
Modern Law Review, 2015). During the past two decades, when we were privileged to call 
Mike our colleague, collaborator, co-author and friend, he produced a formidable corpus of 
scholarship spanning a great variety of topics in evidence, proof and criminal procedure. 
The contributors to this Special Issue celebrate Redmayne's scholarly legacy in a way that 
will ensure its continuing influence, and which--incidentally--would have been 
wholeheartedly endorsed by the man himself; that is, by engaging critically with 
Redmayne's arguments, following up his tentative suggestions for further exploration and 
developing the ideas and debates which Redmayne's extensive publications did so much to 
stimulate, enliven and enlighten. Whilst necessarily selective in their topical focus and not 
afraid to express criticisms and contrary opinions, the following seven essays and reviews 
are united in illuminating the breadth, originality and perspicuity of Redmayne's 
evidentiary scholarship. 
In the opening article, Hamish Stewart revisits the perplexing topic of the privilege against 
self-incrimination. Despite its venerable common law heritage and recent reinvigoration as 
an integral part of the right to a fair trial in international human rights law, identifying a 
convincing normative rationale for the privilege is no simple task (see further, Roberts and 
Zuckerman, 2010: chapter 13). In one of his most imaginative contributions, Redmayne 
proposed a novel rationale for the privilege against self-incrimination rooted in the (liberal) 
value of dissociating oneself from state prosecutions (Redmayne, 2007a). Stewart 
questions whether the argument can succeed without a more structured approach to 
balancing competing values, which Redmayne's account cannot avoid without sacrificing 
its institutional plausibility. Whilst praising Redmayne's argument for its humanity, 
creativity and practicality, Stewart suggests that a richer account of criminal procedure 
linking the privilege against self-incrimination with the presumption of innocence may 
achieve a superior reconciliation between criminal adjudication and its underlying moral 
and political rationales. 
The right to confrontation is another potent witches' brew of common law tradition, human 
rights law and deeper normative obscurity that attracted Redmayne's critical attentions 
(Redmayne, 2012a, 2012b), and is the subject of Liz Heffernan's contribution to this 
Special Issue. Redmayne intervened in the debate shortly after the Grand Chamber of the 
European Court of Human Rights issued its eagerlyanticipated judgment in Al-Khawaja.1 
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Heffernan reviews the "Al-Khawaja saga' and brings it up to date with the Horncastle2 
applicants' recent, unsuccessful, visit to Strasbourg.3 Tensions between orthodox common 
law thinking about admissible hearsay and the notion of a procedural right to confront 
(whether articulated on the pattern of the US Sixth Amendment, or in the more equivocal 
language of ECHR Art 6(3)(d))4 are central to this discussion. Heffernan praises 
Redmayne's interpretation of the confrontation right for its pragmatism and elegance, but 
also notes its vulnerability to attack for being too narrow in some contexts - too easily 
permitting convictions to rest on the evidence of absent witnesses--but too broad in others, 
for example, in failing to have sufficient regard for the dignitarian interests of crime victims 
and vulnerable witnesses. As is evident from subsequent case law,5 the doctrinal contours 
of an ECHR-compliant right of confrontation are still far from settled. But the factors 
insightfully discussed by Redmayne will continue to frame ongoing debates. 
The third article in this Special Issue, by Cheng and Nunn, shifts gears and takes us onto 
different terrain. One of Redmayne's principal--arguably his greatest--contributions to 
British Evidence scholarship was his pioneering role in emphasising systematic analysis of 
inferential reasoning as a necessary supplement to the elucidation and critique of 
exclusionary rules (see, for example, Redmayne, 1999, 2003a, 2003b, 2007, 2008a). A 
major strand of this research programme involved popularising and developing debates on 
forensic probability that, prior to Redmayne's decisive interventions (including Redmayne, 
1995, 1997, 1998, 2001, 2003c; Redmayne and Allen, 1997), had made little impact on 
this side of the Atlantic. Cheng and Nunn propose an ingenious solution to a very 
well-known puzzle concerning proof by "naked statistical evidence'. When Redmayne 
himself reviewed the so-called "proof paradoxes' (see Feinberg, 1986; Kaye, 1979), in one 
of the most lucid discussions to be found anywhere in a voluminous literature on this 
mind-bending topic, he was forced to conclude that no entirely satisfactory, integrated 
account could be offered (Redmayne, 2008b). Cheng and Nunn, however, present an 
approach, rooted in statistical science, which enables them to convert continuous 
probabilities into dichotomous, categorical conclusions without--they claim--arbitrariness 
in the choice of thresholds. To readers unfamiliar with this style of literature or frightened 
of anything with numbers or graphs, the argument may appear abstruse and scholastic. In 
fact, it addresses the structural logic underpinning all scientific6 evidence, including DNA 
profiling; and if Cheng and Nunn are right, their argument for what they dub "DNA 
exceptionalism' could have major practical implications for the way in which scientific and 
other expert evidence is written up and presented to fact-finders in criminal trials (cf. Cole 
and Roberts, 2012; Saks and Koehler, 2005, 2008). 
Bad character evidence was one of Redmayne's enduring preoccupations, and the subject 
of his last major work, a monograph on Character in the Criminal Trial (CitCT) (Redmayne, 
2015; also Redmayne, 1999, 2002a, 2002b, 2008c, 2011). The quartet of contributions 
completing this Special Issue make this fascinating and complex topic their focus. Federico 
Picinali addresses theoretical aspects of the common law's traditional hostility towards 
evidence of the accused's extraneous misconduct, which Redmayne, somewhat 
controversially, called into question.7 According to one view, which Redmayne rejected, 
bad character evidence is problematic because it denies the autonomy of the accused by 
treating people as though they are incapable of breaking their bad habits.8 Amit Pundik has 
recently attempted to revive and develop this line of argument, introducing some 
metaphysical big guns from philosophies of free will, determinism and causation into the 
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evidentiary fray (Pundik, 2008, 2015). Picinali is underwhelmed. He argues in reply that 
the diversion into metaphysical territory does not produce the conclusions that Pundik 
asserts or requires, and that Redmayne's original rejection of autonomy-based objections 
to bad character evidence emerges from this stern theoretical re-examination unscathed. 
For Picinali (as for Sherlock Holmes), drawing inferences from generalisations about 
character is a more complex and contested enterprise than any reductive appeal to the 
value of autonomy could adequately grasp. Be that as it may, one thing is virtually certain: 
we are only in the midst of this lively debate, which has every appearance of enduring 
vitality. 
Redmayne frequently credited David Hamer's penetrating analyses of character-based 
inferential reasoning as a formative influence on his own scholarship. Hamer's contribution 
to this Special Issue recapitulates the account that he developed over a series of articles to 
impose structure and order on the chaos of common law "similar facts' jurisprudence (see 
in particular Hamer, 2003). Hamer carefully classifies and dissects the patterns of 
inferential reasoning which character evidence may logically support, and relates them to 
the variety of legal frameworks governing the admissibility and legitimate (and 
illegitimate) uses of such information in criminal trials and the policy rationales 
underpinning evidentiary doctrines. His approach is in the spirit of "common law 
comparativism' (a method elucidated in Roberts and Hunter, 2012), extrapolating from a 
core common law tradition which, in modern times, has been adapted and refined in 
particular jurisdictions to produce idiosyncratic doctrinal variations, often partly as a result 
of systematic statutory reform. Hamer's synoptic analysis encompasses relevant 
provisions of the US Federal Rules of Evidence, Australia's Uniform Evidence Law, New 
Zealand's Evidence Act 2006 and the post-Criminal Justice Act 2003 bad character 
evidence law of England and Wales, noting many doctrinal intricacies, conceptual 
difficulties and competing conceptions of common law orthodoxy along the way. Hamer's 
objectives are diagnostic rather than programmatic. Adopting a methodological posture 
which Redmayne also found conducive, he suggests that greater analytical clarity might at 
least ease some of the law's most troublesome symptoms without, however, promising any 
miracle cures for complex conditions. 
In the first of our pair of reviews of CitCT (also see Roberts, 2016), Jill Hunter demonstrates 
the value of interdisciplinary approaches to evidentiary questions. In particular, she 
situates the uses of (bad) character evidence in the historical evolution of modern English 
criminal trials, before revisiting some of the psychological research on character and 
conduct that Redmayne also discusses in his monograph (Redmayne, 2015: chapters 2-3). 
Attention to legal history supplies an important corrective to any blithe assumptions about 
the common law's supposed hostility in practice to receiving bad character evidence. In 
reality, character evidence has plainly been central to criminal adjudication in England and 
Wales for as long as anybody can remember, and the juridical logic of character-based 
fact-finding was extended to cross-examination of the accused in person under the 
Criminal Evidence Act 1898 (itself now an historical detail remote from the experience of 
law graduates in the post-Criminal Justice Act 2003 era). In relation to psychological data, 
Hunter stresses the range of situational factors that apparently affect recidivism rates, for 
example in terms of gender differentials. The implication may be that extraneous 
misconduct evidence is not safe to go to the jury unless jurors are also supplied with 
additional contextual information about the individual accused to enable them to use it 
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properly. Besides, notes Hunter, extensive research on "biases and heuristics' cautions 
against the ease with which human beings may be cognitively hard-wired to reason 
stereotypically from very incomplete information (also see Cunliffe, 2014; Ellison and 
Munro, 2015). In conclusion, Hunter firmly endorses Redmayne's interdisciplinary methods 
and applauds the quality of his scholarship and forensic argumentation, but cannot accept 
the drift of his policy conclusions. It is perhaps worth adding that the theses advanced in 
CitCT are themselves often stated with reservation or significantly qualified,9 so the 
distance between Hunter and Redmayne should not be exaggerated, even on the central 
question of the admissibility of propensity evidence in criminal trials. 
Finally, Aparna Rao's pithy book review wraps up this Special Issue with some observations 
from the frontline of criminal advocacy. As she notes, CitCT is not intended to be a textbook 
for legal *E. & P. 92  practitioners, but it still has much to offer criminal litigation in terms 
of conceptual analysis and doctrinal criticism. Redmayne was first and foremost a scholar 
and a teacher, but this does not mean that he lacked practical interests or concerns about 
the law in action. As an active and valued member of the Royal Statistical Society's 
Working Group on Statistics and the Law,10 for example, Redmayne lent his shoulder to 
the wheel of communicating the logic of probabilistic reasoning to practitioner audiences 
(Redmayne et al., 2011; Roberts et al., 2011a, 2011b, 2015a, 2015b). In similar vein, his 
explorations of the privilege against self-incrimination, confrontation and hearsay, 
relevance, expert evidence and the law of bad character are as much concerned with the 
practical realities of criminal adjudication and the normative development of evidence law 
as they are lasting contributions to a theoretical jurisprudence. 
It is time for the contributors to this Special Issue to speak for themselves. They do so from 
five jurisdictions11 across three continents, and if geographical spread had been an 
editorial ambition we could easily have recruited further contributions from leading 
Evidence scholars based in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Mike Redmayne was a scholar of 
truly global stature, and his scholarship will illuminate the world of Evidence and Proof for 
many years to come. 
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